The recently concluded US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been widely welcomed as a significant diplomatic effort to ease tensions in West Asia. Reached in the wake of escalating hostilities between Iran and Israel and growing concerns over the security of key maritime routes, the agreement aims to reduce the risk of further escalation and avert a broader regional conflict. In a region marked by repeated wars, persistent instability, and recurring security challenges, any initiative that helps prevent direct confrontation and promotes stability is a positive development.
Yet diplomacy and security are not always synonymous.
While the MoU may contribute towards reducing immediate tensions between Iran, Israel, and the United States, it leaves several questions unanswered regarding the broader regional security architecture. The distinction is important because de-escalation and long-term security often operate at different levels. An agreement may succeed in preventing a wider conflict without necessarily addressing the local political and military realities that continue to generate insecurity on the ground.
The future of southern Lebanon and the security of Israel’s northern frontier constitute one such example.
I arrived in northern Israel on June 14, the day the agreement was digitally signed. During discussions with academics, security experts, local officials, and residents in communities such as Kfar Giladi, Metula, and Kiryat Shmona, there was broad support for diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a wider regional conflict. At the same time, a recurring concern emerged. While the agreement addresses regional escalation, it offers limited clarity regarding the future security environment along the Israel-Lebanon border and the unresolved questions surrounding state authority in southern Lebanon.
This distinction becomes evident when viewed from the frontier itself.
Unlike many international borders, the Israel-Lebanon frontier is shaped by hills, ridgelines, valleys, and elevated villages that overlook large stretches of territory on either side. During my visit to Kfar Giladi and nearby observation points, the strategic significance of this geography became immediately apparent. Across the border, Lebanese villages such as Kfar Kila, El Adeisseh, and Maroun al-Ras occupy commanding positions overlooking northern Israel. From these locations, extensive areas of Israeli territory, including civilian communities, roads, agricultural land, and critical infrastructure, remain visible.
In this context, geography is not merely a physical characteristic of the landscape. It is a strategic asset.
The significance of these villages is linked less to their size than to their location. Israeli security assessments have long expressed concern regarding Hezbollah’s presence and operational infrastructure in and around these areas, which have featured prominently in discussions surrounding surveillance, intelligence gathering, logistical networks, and military preparedness near the border. Since the October 2023 Hamas attack, Israeli security planners have also focused on Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force and the possibility of cross-border operations in the event of future hostilities.
For communities such as Metula, Kiryat Shmona, and Kfar Giladi, these concerns are not abstract strategic calculations. During successive rounds of conflict, tens of thousands of residents from northern Israel were displaced from their homes. Schools were shut, businesses closed, agricultural activity was disrupted, and local economies came under severe strain. Metula, Israel’s northernmost town, was almost entirely evacuated, while Kiryat Shmona witnessed one of the largest civilian displacements in the country’s north. For many residents, security is measured not by diplomatic communiqués but by whether families can return home and resume normal lives without the expectation of another round of conflict.
These realities help explain why many observers along Israel’s northern frontier continue to question whether the current agreement adequately addresses the conditions that have shaped insecurity for decades.
At the same time, reducing the discussion to Israeli security concerns alone would provide only a partial picture.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the MoU is the manner in which it incorporates Lebanon within a broader framework focused on regional de-escalation and maritime stability. The principal drivers behind the recent crisis were concerns surrounding direct Iran-Israel confrontation and the potential disruption of strategic waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. As one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, the Strait carries a significant proportion of global oil exports and remains central to international energy security.
Southern Lebanon, however, represents a fundamentally different security theatre.
Lebanon was neither a principal actor in the maritime dimensions of the crisis nor a central participant in the Gulf security equation. The challenges confronting southern Lebanon revolve around border security, Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the authority of the Lebanese state, and the long-term stability of the Israel-Lebanon frontier. These concerns differ substantially from those associated with maritime deterrence, freedom of navigation, and Gulf energy security.
Consequently, stability in the Strait of Hormuz does not automatically translate into stability along the Blue Line, the UN-demarcated line of withdrawal that serves as the de facto border between Israel and Lebanon. Likewise, progress in US-Iran relations does not necessarily resolve the unresolved questions surrounding Hezbollah’s military role, the future of southern Lebanon, or the security concerns of communities living on both sides of the border.
This is where the agreement appears incomplete.
The MoU approaches Lebanon largely through the lens of regional de-escalation between Iran and Israel. Yet many of the challenges confronting Lebanon today are fundamentally domestic in nature. They concern governance, state authority, economic recovery, institutional capacity, and the relationship between the state and non-state armed actors.
The future of southern Lebanon cannot be understood solely as an extension of Iranian regional influence. Hezbollah’s rise was shaped not only by regional dynamics but also by Lebanon’s own political history, periods of state weakness, the legacy of civil conflict, and the inability of successive governments to establish an effective monopoly over the use of force. Over time, Hezbollah expanded its influence beyond military affairs into welfare provision, healthcare, education, and local governance, particularly in areas where state institutions were weak or absent.
Yet the debate within Lebanon itself is evolving.
The country’s prolonged economic crisis, political paralysis, and repeated cycles of instability have intensified discussions regarding sovereignty, governance, and state authority. Increasingly, the question confronting Lebanon is not simply whether Hezbollah can deter external threats, but whether the Lebanese state can achieve political stability, economic recovery, and effective governance while maintaining parallel centres of military authority.
This debate extends beyond government institutions. Across significant sections of Lebanon’s Christian and Sunni political spectrum, concerns have grown regarding the long-term implications of maintaining armed structures outside the exclusive authority of the state. While Hezbollah continues to enjoy substantial support among large segments of Lebanon’s Shi’a community and political allies, a broader national conversation has increasingly shifted towards questions of sovereignty, institutional authority, and statehood.
Recent statements by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reflect this evolving discourse. Both leaders have repeatedly emphasised the importance of strengthening state institutions, extending state authority across Lebanese territory, and ensuring that decisions concerning war and peace remain the prerogative of the Lebanese state. Their focus has not been on direct confrontation with Hezbollah but on reinforcing the state’s monopoly over the use of force and restoring confidence in national institutions.
This dimension receives limited attention within the MoU.
The agreement offers little clarity regarding how the authority of the Lebanese state will be strengthened in southern Lebanon, how compliance with existing international commitments will be verified, or how the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces will be expanded in areas that have long been characterised by competing centres of authority. Equally important, it does not provide a roadmap for addressing the relationship between Lebanese sovereignty and border security.
In reality, these issues are increasingly interconnected. A stronger Lebanese state is not only a prerequisite for strengthening sovereignty; it may also be one of the most important requirements for creating a more stable and secure frontier. Border security and state-building should therefore not be viewed as competing objectives. In the case of southern Lebanon, they are mutually reinforcing.
The broader challenge is that the MoU addresses escalation without fully addressing security architecture. It may contribute towards lowering tensions between regional actors, but it provides limited guidance regarding how the structural drivers of insecurity along the Israel-Lebanon border will be addressed. Questions surrounding Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River, implementation of UNSCR 1701, verification mechanisms, confidence-building measures, and the future role of Lebanese state institutions remain largely unresolved.
The agreement may therefore succeed in reducing tensions between Iran and Israel and safeguarding maritime stability in the Gulf. These are significant achievements. Whether it can contribute towards a sustainable security framework stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Blue Line remains a more difficult question.
Until the issues of border security, Hezbollah’s military role, implementation of existing international commitments, and Lebanese state authority are addressed, the agreement may provide an important diplomatic pause. Whether it can deliver a durable regional security architecture is a question that remains open.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
