For all the pageantry of the highly anticipated US-China summit, the signals told the story of a deeply competitive relationship that is unlikely to return to the old normal. This is despite some convergence on market access, stability, and both leaders’ apparent belief that Quad countries — without the US — should increasingly fend for themselves.
And yet, beneath the surface, tensions remain high and the two countries continue to differ sharply in both interests and values.
China’s new phrase for the relationship — “constructive strategic stability” — captures this reality. In simple terms, it means accepting long-term competition but keeping it under control. For Beijing, this appears to be the formal framework for ties over the next several years. It accepts that rivalry between two major powers is unavoidable, while also signalling that diplomacy alone will not restore harmony.
President Xi Jinping repeatedly spoke about the need for both sides to steer the “giant ship” of US-China ties through choppy waters. That suggests China mainly wanted some room for manoeuvre, which was what the summit was all about. Expectations of a major breakthrough, or the emergence of some kind of G2 arrangement, should therefore be set aside.
That said, it is this room for manoeuvre that offers the most interesting takeaways from the meetings. First, Trump’s priorities centered largely on securing sellable outcomes. To show willingness, Xi, too, agreed that China must open its markets wider. 17 American CEOs travelling with Trump hoped for exactly that.
Some deals Trump and his travelling salesmen did get. China agreed to purchase 200 aircraft, even though its own C919 aircraft is meant to compete with Boeing and Airbus in the future. Beyond promises on soybeans and rare earths, the more meaningful concessions on sales of Nvidia H200 chips and Tesla robotaxis will be much harder for Beijing to grant. These face either strict Chinese licensing rules or resistance because they compete with powerful Chinese firms such as Baidu and SMIC. That is the reality of ‘reciprocal’ market access today, despite the optics of Elon Musk and Xiaomi founder Lei Jun sharing selfies at the summit banquet.
The deeper problem in the relationship is that the US-China competition has now become the most aggravated in a few critical sectors, while China increasingly shapes the terms everywhere else. This does not mean American pressure has failed. It has clearly slowed Chinese ambitions in advanced semiconductors, aviation engines, biotech, and AI computing. In some areas, China still lags well behind the US. But there is also a reason behind why Trump appears to be seeking some accommodation since the Busan summit late last year.
Dependence is a two-way street, and China has retaliatory capabilities elsewhere — in rare earths and critical minerals, for instance, but also in the iPhone screens Tim Cook and Lens Tech CEO Zhou Qunfei likely discussed at the summit, or in agro-consumer goods Cargill CEO Brian Sikes cared about while in Beijing.
Faced with the choice between aggressively squeezing the Chinese economy or preserving access to those critical supply chains, Trump appears to have chosen the latter.
For now, he seems content to compete at the margins, so long as China’s broader growth and ambitions remain manageable. That approach suits Beijing. As Xi himself told Trump, ‘Making America Great Again’ and the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’ can go hand-in-hand. However, Xi, too, did not hold all the cards and got little from Trump on Taiwan.
The broader mood around the summit also reflected growing concerns about the reliability of the US as the centre of its alliance system — many parts of which were originally designed to balance China. This includes the Quad, semiconductor partnerships, NATO, and broader transatlantic arrangements. As Trump increasingly handles China through direct bilateral bargaining — while relying heavily on the American private sector — alliances appear to be becoming less central to US strategy.
For India, there are two major takeaways.
First, the era of the US acting as a dependable partner in containing China may effectively be over — at least under this administration, though the effects could last much longer. India will therefore have to push strategic autonomy much further by building stronger domestic capabilities and diversifying partnerships, including maintaining working ties with Beijing and Moscow.
Second, the Quad can no longer remain the centrepiece of India’s regional strategy if Washington itself is stepping back from leadership. New Delhi will need to work more closely with Tokyo, Canberra, Seoul, Europe, and ASEAN to help build a regional balance that does not depend entirely on the US, even while maintaining stable ties with Washington.
The summit may ultimately be remembered as the moment middle powers were clearly told they were on their own. The space to shape what comes next remains open but navigating it will require careful steering in an increasingly difficult era of great-power competition.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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